Agent Identity
The Playground identifies itself cryptographically on every request. This page explains how to check that a request really came from the Playground's agent.
The agent profile
Every request the Playground makes carries a UCP-Agent header pointing at its public profile:
UCP-Agent: profile="https://ucpplayground.com/.well-known/ucp-agent" That document is a standard UCP platform profile: a ucp member declaring the capabilities the Playground supports, plus a root-level keys array: a JWK Set of public EC keys used to verify its request signatures.
{
"ucp": {
"version": "2026-08-25",
"services": {},
"capabilities": { "dev.ucp.shopping.checkout": [ /* ... */ ] },
"payment_handlers": {}
},
"keys": [
{ "kid": "...", "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "...", "y": "...", "use": "sig", "alg": "ES256" }
],
"signing_keys": [ /* the same set, for verifiers still on v2026-04-08 */ ]
}keys is a sibling of ucp at the document root — not nested inside it. Verifiers resolve a key as profile.keys and match it to a request by kid. v2026-08-25 made keys the canonical field, replacing signing_keys; the Playground publishes both, and reads either from your profile, so verification works whichever version you are on. Verifying the Playground's requests
Requests are signed with HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421, ECDSA P-256 / ES256), in the default shape of the UCP signatures specification. A signed request looks like this:
POST /ucp/v1/catalog/search HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
UCP-Agent: profile="https://ucpplayground.com/.well-known/ucp-agent"
Idempotency-Key: <uuid>
Content-Digest: sha-256=:<base64 sha-256 of body>:
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@authority" "@path" "ucp-agent" "idempotency-key" "content-digest" "content-type");created=<unix time>;keyid="<kid from keys>"
Signature: sig1=:<base64 signature>: The signature label is sig1 and its only parameters are created and keyid. There is no tag and no alg: UCP defines no tag of its own, and the algorithm comes from the published key (kty/crv). The covered components follow the request: @query when there is a query string, idempotency-key when that header is sent, content-digest and content-type when there is a body. To verify one:
- Read the profile URL from the
UCP-Agentheader and fetch it over HTTPS. - Parse
Signature-Inputfor the covered components and thekeyid, and check the components cover the method, authority and path, plus each of the headers above that the request carries. - Find the matching key in
keysbykid. - Confirm
Content-Digestequals the SHA-256 of the raw body. - Reconstruct the signature base and verify the signature against the public key.
Verification is optional. The spec makes signing a SHOULD, and you may process unsigned requests, but verifying lets you trust the caller's identity rather than the header string alone.
This applies to UCP requests over MCP and REST. A website run is different: it loads your page in an ordinary browser and uses the tools the page registers, so those page loads carry no UCP-Agent header or request signature.
To see what your store does with unsigned traffic, start a run on Runs and set Who the agent is to Unsigned. The default is UCP platform identity, which signs as described here.
Order webhooks
Your store signs the order webhooks it sends back the same way, with a key in your own UCP profile. Where to send them, how they are verified and how to see them in a run: Order webhooks.
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